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1. Introduction 
The traditional theories of corporate risk m anagement show that re ducing risk can increase 
shareholder value by reducing expected taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs , information 
asymmetries, and payments to undiversified stakeholders of the firm .1 However, empirical tests 
of the predictions of th ese theories have met with only lim ited success.2 While each empirical 
study uncovers evidence that can be  interpreted as being consiste nt with one or m ore of the 
theories of hedging, there is little consistency across studies. In addition, much of the variation in 
firms’ derivatives strategies, both cross-sectio nally and ov er time, remains unexplained. This 
disparity between theory and practice is remarkably consistent with an argument advanced nearly 
50 years ago by W orking (1962), that the “tradi tional” risk avoidance notion of hedging – 
matching one risk with an opposing risk – is deficient when it com es to explaining hedging 
behavior in practice. Indee d, the growing evidence that m any managers system atically 
incorporate their m arket views into  their risk m anagement programs,3 but fail to generate 
positive cash flows from this “selective hedging” strategy on average,4 suggests that m anagers 
deviate at times from the pure rationality assumed by the neoclassical theories of hedging. 
In this paper, we study the risk m anagement activities of a sam ple of North Am erican 
gold mining firms and present new evidence, w hich suggests that behavioral m anagerial biases 
affect corporate risk management strategies. A growing literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
studies the im pact of managerial biases on corporate decisions. 5 Several m anagerial biases, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Stultz (1984), Smith and Stultz (1985), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), DeMarzo and Duffie 
(1995), Leland (1998), Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) and Mello and Parsons (2000). 
2 See, for example, Tufano (1996), Mian (1996), Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Graham and Smith (1999), 
Haushalter (2000) and Graham and Rogers (2002). 
3 See, for example, Dolde (1993), Stultz (1996), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), and Glaum (2002). 
4 See Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006). 
5 Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) provide a co mprehensive review of the literature on behavioral corporate 
finance. 
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including loss aversion, m ental accounting, and overconfidence, have been found to affect 
corporate investment policies, capital structure decisions, m ergers and acquisitions, security 
offerings, and investment bank relationships.6 Given that the em pirical evidence in f avor of the 
neoclassical theories of hedgi ng is weak, it seem s warranted to examine whether behavioral 
managerial biases affect corporate risk management decisions.  
In particular, we focus on the managerial overconfidence hypothesis (e.g., Heaton (2002); 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008)), which im plies that managers may be overconfident in their 
ability to beat the market, engaging in excessive position shifting under the mistaken belief that 
they have a relative information advantage. In particular, overconfidence is expected to increase 
following successes, but decrease less (if at all)  following failures. This asymm etric response 
follows from selective self-attribution: successes tend to be attributed to one’s own skill, while 
failures tend to be attributed to bad luck. Indeed, we find that managers tend to increase the level 
of their speculative activities  using derivatives following specu lative gains, but do not reduce  
their speculative activities follo wing speculative losses. This asymm etric response, which 
persists after controlling fo r firm fixed-effects and seve ral other tim e-varying firm 
characteristics, is d ifficult to re concile with rational theories of risk m anagement, but is 
consistent with the presence of managerial overconfidence.  
The results are sign ificant because they show that managerial behavioral biases can also 
impact corporate risk m anagement. Recognizing that managers sometimes deviate from  strict 
rationality is likely to improve our understandi ng of corporate risk m anagement decisions and 
help close the gap between the observed practice of  risk management and the extant neoclassical 
theories that seek to explain it.  
                                                 
6 Studies include Roll (1986), Loughran and Ritter ( 2002), Heaton (2002), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005), 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007), Billett and Qian (2008), Goel and 
Thakor (2008), Sautner and Weber (2009), and Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2009). 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as  follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature and derives testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample, the construction of our 
variables and the em pirical methodology. Section 4 presents the em pirical evidence on how 
speculation responds to speculativ e gains and losses. Section 5 summarizes the results and 
presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Empirical Hypotheses 
The objective of this paper is to test whether m anagerial behavioral b iases are likely to affect 
corporate risk management decisions. As documented by Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) in 
their excellent rev iew of the growing literature on behavioral  corporate finance, several 
managerial behavioral biases ha ve been shown to affect corpor ate decisions. We investigate the 
potential effects of managerial overconfidence on corporate risk management decisions. 
Managerial overconfidence has been widely docum ented in the recent lite rature (see, for 
example, Russo and S choemaker (1992), Grif fin and Tversky (1992) and Heaton (2002)). 
Overconfident managers systematically overestimate the probability o f good outcom es (and 
correspondingly, underestimate the probability of bad outcom es) resulting from their actions 
(Heaton (2002)). In a dynam ic setting, overco nfidence coupled with biased s elf-attribution 
(Miller and Ross (1975)), where managers credit themselves for successes while blaming outside 
factors for f ailures, cause managerial overconfidence to incr ease following successes but not 
commensurately decrease following failures (Dan iel, Hirshleifer and Subrahm anyam (1998); 
Gervais and Odean (2001)). The im plications for corporate financial decisions are that 
overconfident managers act more decisively and a ggressively, and that this  behavior intensifies 
following successes. Several studies, including Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Ben-David, 
Graham and Harvey (2007), Billett and Qian (2008), and Malm endier, Tate and Yan (2011), 
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report empirical evidence consistent with ove rconfident managers, while Barber and Odean 
(2000) report similar evidence in the context of overconfident individual investors. 
We test the overconfidence hypo thesis in the context of corporate risk m anagement. 
There is ample evidence that managers incorporate their m arket views into their hedgin g 
decisions, and thus hedge “selectively.” 7 Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb and 
Haushalter (2006) document significant time-series variation in the size of the hedge positions of 
gold mining firms, which may reflect managers’ changing market views about future gold prices. 
In the absence of an information advantage with respect to gold prices, however, incorporating a 
manager’s private market view into a hedging progr am is inconsistent with neoclassical theories 
of risk m anagement. Indeed, Adam and Fe rnando (2006) and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter 
(2006) do not find systematic gains from selective hedging, which implies that managers of gold 
mining firms do not possess an inform ation advantage on average. Th us, the significant tim e-
series variation in firms’ hedge positions is likely to be inconsistent with rational explanations of 
corporate hedging. 
The managerial overconfidence hypothesis applied in the context of corporate speculation 
implies that managers grow more overconfident following past speculative successes, leading to 
a more aggressive pursuit of speculative strategies, while past failures would diminish managers’ 
willingness to speculate  to a less er degree, if  at all. Hence,  we expect an asymm etric relation 
between speculative activities and the past performance of speculative positions, where managers 
increase their speculative activities followi ng successes in specu lation, while they do not 
commensurately decrease speculation following failures in speculation. 
 
                                                 
7 See Dolde (1993), Stultz (1996), Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), and Glaum (2002).  
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3. Data and Methodology 
Our sample consists of 92 gold m ining firms in North America, which are included in the Gold 
and Silver Hedge Outlook, a quarterly survey of derivatives  activities conducted by Ted Reeve, 
an analyst at Scotia McLeod, from 1989 through 1999, when he discontinued the survey. 8 These 
92 firms represent the m ajority of firm s in the gold m ining industry (see Tufano (1996) and 
Adam and Fernando (2006)). Firms not included in the survey tend to be sm all or privately held 
corporations.  
The survey contains inform ation on all outst anding gold derivatives positions, their size 
and direction, maturities, and the respective delivery prices for each instrument (forwards, spot-
deferred contracts, gold loans and options). This derivatives data is  described in detail in Adam 
(2002). We hand-collect operational data: gol d production (in ounces), production costs per 
ounce of gold, and gold reserves, from  firms’ annual reports. The data on firm characteristics 
such as size, m arket-to-book, leverage, liquidity , existence of a credit rating, and paym ent of 
quarterly dividends com es from Compustat. Data on m anagerial compensation is from 
ExecuComp, supplemented by han d collection from proxy statem ents where necessary. A ll 
variable notations and definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
We measure the ex tent of derivatives usage at a giv en point in time t with tim e to 
maturity i by a hedge ratio HR(i)t, defined as follows: 
 
]Prod[
)(
)(
itt
t
t E
iNiHR

 , (1) 
where N(i)t is the sum  of the firm’s derivatives positions in place a t time t (in ounces of gold) 
that mature in i years, weighted by their respec tive deltas, as in Tufano (1996). Et[Prodt+i] is the 
                                                 
8 While some post-2000 hedging data is available from accounting disclosures and other sources, this data lacks the 
level of detail and consistency across firms that has made the Scotia McLeod survey data invaluable for m any 
empirical studies of c orporate hedging, including Tufano (1996, 1998), Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), Adam and 
Fernando (2006), and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006). 
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firms’s expectation of its gold pro duction (in ounces of gold) at tim e t+i as of time t. The 
maturity i of a derivatives position can be 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 years, although most derivatives activity 
takes place with contracts that m ature within three years. To check robustness of our results we 
aggregate (a) contracts with 1-3 years maturity and (b) contracts with 1-5 years maturity.  
The derivatives survey  reports th e expected production for each hedge horizon i 
whenever a firm has derivatives pos itions outstanding that m ature in i years. If a firm does not  
hedge a particular maturity, then the expected production figures are missing. In this case we use 
the actual gold production in year t+i. Since m ost firms do not hedge their gold production 
beyond three years, the problem of missing expected production figures increases with the hedge 
horizon. Therefore, we also defi ne an alternat e hedge ratio, HRRes(i)t, that does not rely on 
expected production but scales a firm’s total derivatives position by its total gold reserve (see Jin 
and Jorion (2006)): 
 
t
t
t
iNiHR
Reserve Gold
)(
)(Res  . (2) 
In addition to helping overcome potential issues associated with missing production data, scaling 
by reserves is also a useful robustness check of our analysis using production-based hedge ratios, 
due to the possibility that som e time-series variation in the production-based hedge ratio m ay be 
due to unplanned variations in expected production ra ther than a change in the firm’s derivatives 
positions.  
We observe the above hedge ratios ever y quarter from  December 1989 to December 
1999. This data allows us to m easure the extent of  speculation (selective hedging) by the tim e-
series volatility in hedge ratios. To obtain qua rterly volatility estimates while also m aximizing 
the number of observations in our relatively sm all sample, we follow the existing lite rature on 
volatility estimation and calculate volatility by  the absolute change in  a firm ’s hedge ratio.  
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Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (20 02) review the large bo dy of literature that estimates time-
varying volatility using two daily observations : either open and c lose, or h igh and low. They  
argue, in particular, that the ra nge, or the difference in log pri ces between daily high and daily 
low, is a good proxy for daily volatility. To quote, “…the discretized stochastic volatility model 
is difficult to estimate because the sample path of the asset price within each interval is not fully  
observed…. In practice, we are forced to use disc retely observed statistics of the sample paths, 
such as the absolu te or squared returns over each interval, to  draw inferences about th e 
discretized log volatilities and their dynam ics…” The m easure advocated by Alizadeh et al. 
(2002) has been used not only in m arket microstructure but also, for exam ple, in asset pricing 
research. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) mention using the range-based volatility 
measure as a proxy for innovations in aggregate m arket volatility, in order to estimate whether  
exposure to these innovations is a priced risk. Thus, we define the extent of speculation in 
quarter t, Vt, as the absolute value of  the difference in the natural loga rithms of the hedge ratio s 
at the beginning and the end of each quarter.9  
 )]/([ 1 ttt HRHRLNABSV  (3) 
This approach permits us to obtain quarterly volat ility estimates, in contrast to (at best) annual 
volatility estimates that we w ould obtain using the tim e-series standard deviation of hedge 
ratios.10 
                                                 
9 For the purpose of measuring percentage changes, whenever a firm reports a zero he dge (unless it re ports a zero 
value in both the beginning and the end of the quarter), we substitute a very small value. The percentage change is 
then calculated as the difference of the natural logarithms from quarter (t-1) to quarter t. 
10 An apparent refinement would be to estimate predicted hedge ratios as in Adam and Fernando (2006) and use the 
hedge ratio residuals to compute speculation. However, as demonstrated by Adam and Fe rnando (2006) in their 
robustness checks, speculation computed using hedge ratio residuals does not yield substantively different results to 
speculation computed using total hedge ratios, which may be due in part to the inability of fundamental variables to 
explain the variation in hedge ratios. 
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We use se veral constructs to m easure the past performance of fir ms’ derivatives 
activities. First, we com pute the quarterly total cash flows generated from  derivatives positions 
per ounce of gold hedged, as in Adam and Fernando (2006). Second, we recalculate the quarterly 
cash flows assuming a firm  had maintained a cons tant hedge ratio (“benchm ark cash flows”) . 
The difference between  the to tal derivatives cash flow and the ca sh flow computed using this 
fixed hedge ratio benchm ark is the cash flow  that we attribute to selective hedging.11 Positive 
selective hedging cash f lows constitute “speculative gains” and negative selective hedging cash 
flows constitute “speculative losses.” Selective hedging cash flow is an attractive m easure 
because it reflects the p art of the cash flow that results d irectly from managerial market timing, 
i.e., speculative, actions.12 Finally, in addition to the above cash flow measures, we also calculate 
the quarterly derivatives book profit  (or loss), which is computed as the quarterly change in the 
value of derivatives positions in dollars per ounce hedged. Please refer to Appendix 2 for the 
calculation of quarterly changes in the book value of derivatives positions. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the descri ptive statistics and the correlations for the different hedge 
ratios and hedge ratio volatility measures.  
[Place Tables 1 & 2 about here] 
Several observations em erge from these tabl es. Consistent with Adam and Fernando 
(2006), selective hedging cash flows average at around zero, suggesting th at selective hedging 
does not add value to the firm  on a systematic basis. We notice that the hedge ratios of different 
maturities are all significantly correlated with one another. However, the correlations are weaker 
between shorter-maturity and longer-maturity hedge ratios. The aggregate hedge ratios are less 
                                                 
11 Adam and Fernando (2006) provide details on the computation of these cash flows. 
12 For example, suppose a manager believes that the gold price is going to rise and therefore reduces the hedge ratio 
relative to the benchmark. If she is correct in her forecast, then the total derivatives cash flow will be negative (since 
she is short overall) but the s elective component will be positive: the firm  does not lose as much on the hedge as  it 
could have.  
 11
than perfectly correlated with one another, subs tantiating the need to check robustness of our  
results with respect to different hedge ratio definitions. The same general conclusions hold for 
the hedge ratio volatilities. 
 
3.1  Basic methodology 
Our basic methodology is to run panel regressions with firm fixed effects in order to focus on the 
time-series variation in hedge ratios and hedge  ratio volatility. Our test of managerial 
overconfidence, which is based on the relationsh ip between hedge ratio volatility and past 
speculative gains and losses, needs to be res tricted to active hedgers only (i.e., firms that have 
non-zero hedge ratios and report non-zero cash flows in the previous period). This requirement is 
due to the fact that the overconfidence hypothesis conditions managerial activity on the results of 
previous activity. In addition, leaving non-hedging firm-quarters in the sam ple may lead to a 
spurious regression result with zero past cash flows from derivatives positions “explaining” zero 
hedge ratio volatility next period. Hence, we estimate the panel regression with firm fixed effects 
on a reduced sample of active hedgers.  
For robustness we repeat our tests using th e two-step Heckman (1979) procedure with 
selection. In the first stage, we  model the existence of hedging ac tivity as a function of variables 
that are predicted by extant hedging theory to be determinants of hedging -- firm size, market-to-
book ratio, liquidity, levera ge, dividend payment, credit rati ng, and the likelihood of financial 
distress (Tufano (1996), Haushalter (2000)). We say that a firm  has hedging activity if two 
conditions hold: (1) the beginning or the end-of- quarter hedge ratio is non-zero; and (2) cash 
flows from derivatives positions in the previous quarter are non-zero. In  the second stage of the 
Heckman two-step procedure, we test whether the hedge ratio volatility is driven by past success 
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of the derivatives positions for the firms that exhibit hedging activity as described above. Further 
methodological details are provided in Section 4. 
Our unique data perm its us to employ a methodology that is distinct from and 
complements the techniques em ployed in the othe r studies of corporat e managerial biases. 
Existing studies fall under two categories : surveys, as in Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey  
(2007); and cross-sectional studies , as in Malmendier and Tate (2005). These studies examine a 
variety of characteristics that are likely to affect the degree to which managers exhibit behavioral 
biases. Examples include personal and professional characteristics (age, tenure, education, etc.)  
and personal wealth m anagement practices (the  tendency to hold disp roportionate amounts of 
one’s own firm’s stock, and the fa ilure to exercise vested options). The question in these studies 
is whether cross-sectio nal differences across managers explain actio ns that are attributable to 
behavioral biases. Our work com plements the prior studies by focusing on tim e-series patterns 
that may characterize behavioral biases, exam ining how managers as a group respond to m arket 
movements and their own past perform ance. As noted before, this complementary perspective is 
made possible by our unique data set, which cont ains quarterly observations on all outstanding 
gold derivatives positions of a sample of 92 North American gold mining firms from 1989-1999. 
The key advantage of this data set is that we ar e able to infer actual derivatives transactions and 
the corresponding cash flows as well  as observe the estimates of expected production, which is a 
unique feature of our data set. 
 
3.2  Controlling for alternative explanations 
An alternative explanation for an increase in speculation following high derivatives cash 
flows derived from speculation is that m anagers simply have more cash to use at their discretion 
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or that positive cash flows from speculation improve the firm’s financial strength. We control for 
a firm’s liquidity and financial strength to acc ount for this possibility by including a dividend 
dummy, rating dummy, quick ratio, leverage and Altman’s (1968) Z-score as control variables.13 
Another possibility is that although selective hedging does not  benefit shareholders, it 
may benefit m anagers due to incentive com pensation (Stulz (1996)). While the potential link 
between selective hedging and managerial compensation is explored in several recent studies, the 
results are mixed, with only weak evidence th at managerial compensation significantly affects 
selective hedging and no consensus on the direction of the rela tionship.14 Nevertheless, we 
control for m anagerial compensation variables to allow for this possibility in o ur hedging 
sample.  
Finally, as pointed out by Ca mpbell and Kr acaw (1999), financially constrained firm s 
with good projects m ay speculate more to generate more funds for optim al investment. 
Investment opportunities may also affect the degree to which firm s choose to hedge due to the 
need to raise external financing (F root, Scharfstein and Stein (1993)). W e account for both 
financial constraints and growth  opportunities by includ ing standard control variables such a s 
debt-to-equity and market-to-book ratios. 
  
4. Empirical Evidence: Managerial Responses to Speculative Gains and Losses 
In this section, we test the m anagerial overconfidence hypothesis by exam ining the relation 
between speculation (measured by hedge ratio volat ility) and past speculative gains and losses. 
                                                 
13 It is important to note, however, that in contrast to positive speculative cash flows from derivatives, positive total 
derivatives cash flow need not make the overall financial position of the firm stronger because positive hedge cash 
flows on derivatives positions would typically offset losses due to gold price declines. 
14 Géczy, Minton and Schrand (2007) find that CEO stock price sensitivity is negatively related to speculation while 
CFO stock price sensitivity is positively related. Beber and Fabbri (2006) find no consistent relation between CEO 
delta and selective hedging. Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) find no systematic relationship between selective 
hedging and several ownership and compensation measures.  
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The overconfidence hypothesis m aintains that, all else equal, if past speculative activity was 
successful, resulting in  cash f low gains, then  the m anager will inc rease his/her speculative 
activities in the next period. If, however, past speculative activity was uns uccessful, resulting in 
cash flow losses, then there would  be no comm ensurate reduction in specula tive activities. In 
other words, we expect an asymme tric relation between the degree of  speculative activity and 
past speculative cash flows. 
 
4.1 Initial panel regressions without asymmetry effects 
We begin by examining the general relationship between derivatives cash flows and subsequent 
speculative activity. Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the firm fixed effects panel regressions of 
the hedge ratio v olatility on pas t cash flows and book profits from  derivatives p ositions per 
ounce of gold hedged. W e present the re sults for the volatility of the one-year hedge ratio, the 
three-year aggregate hedge ratio scaled by expected production, the three-year aggregate hedge 
ratio scaled by reserves, and the five-year hedg e ratio scaled by reserves. Table 3 reports the 
results for a specification that em ploys total derivatives cash flows along with derivatives book 
profit as independent variables. Our interest in this spec ification is to investigate whether 
speculative activity responds to past derivatives cash flows and/or book profits. Table 4 reports 
the corresponding results using selective hedging cash flow s (i.e., the speculative component of 
total derivatives cash flows), which is our primary variable of interest.  
[Place Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
Since we are interested in testin g the hypothesis that successful past specu lative 
derivatives activity will lead to hig her speculation in the f uture, we perform these regressions 
after eliminating firm quarters where the f irm had zero cash flows from  derivatives positions, 
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and also elim inating observations where both beginning-of-quarter a nd end-of-quarter hedge 
ratios were zero. In all of the models, we include seasonal dummy variables as controls; 
however, doing so is mostly a concern with the one-year hedge  ratio, which exhibits som e 
seasonal variation, whereas the aggregate hedge ratios exhibit virtually no seasonal variation. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, we also control for firm ch aracteristics that may affect a firm’s level of 
speculative activity, such as liquidity, financial strength, and growth opportunities. 
 As evident f rom Table 3, we ob serve a pos itive relationship between hedge ratio 
volatility and previous quarter total derivatives cash flows, which is robust to model specification 
in terms of both m agnitude and statistical si gnificance. However, we do not observe any 
relationship with the book profit. T his result indicates that speculation responds to derivatives 
cash flows but not to book profits. W e then refi ne the specification to em ploy the selective 
hedging component of derivatives cash flows. From Table 4, we observe that the relationship 
between hedge ratio volatility and selective hedging cash flows is p ositive and signif icant, 
providing evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the success of past selective hedging leads to 
higher levels of speculation in the future. Again,  we do not find a signif icant relationship with 
book profits. Nonetheless, speculation is also positively related to benchmark cash flows, which 
is consistent with our observation in Table 3 for total derivatives cash flows. 
Given that the tests reported in Tables 3 and 4 were performed on a reduced sam ple, we 
next perform robustness checks to control for the possibility of selection bias by allowing for the 
two sequential decisions of the firm, (1) whether or not to  be a d erivatives user and (2) 
conditional on being a derivative s user, how m uch to s peculate. We estim ate the two-step 
Heckman procedure with selection. In the first st age, we estimate a PROBIT m odel, where the 
dependent variable is equal to zero if (1) e ither the firm has zero hedge ratios in both the  
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beginning and the end of quarter  t; or (2) the firm  had zero cash flows from hedging operations 
in quarter t-1. 15 We estimate the likelihood of de rivatives usage as a function of several firm  
characteristics: size, m arket-to-book ratio, the ratio of book debt to book equity, quick ratio, 
dividend-payer status, existence of a credit rating, and Altman’s Z-score. In the second stage, we 
estimate the relationship between hedge ratio volatility and past cash flows and book profits from 
derivatives positions conditional on the firm being a der ivatives user. The results from the two 
stages of the Heckman procedure are presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.  
[Place Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
From Table 5, we observe that firms that use derivatives are large firms with low growth 
opportunities (as indicated by low market-to-book ratios), conservative leverage policies, and 
higher financial constraints/low liq uidity. These results are consiste nt with previously reported 
findings by Geczy, Minton a nd Schrand (1997), Bodnar, Ha yt and Marston (1998) and 
Haushalter (2000). 
The Heckman second-stage results reported in Table 6 are consistent with our previous 
findings reported in Tables 3 and 4.  In all regression specifications, we observe a p ositive and 
significant relationship between hedge ratio volatility and past  cash flows from derivatives 
positions, whether tota l derivatives cash f lows or selective hedging cas h flows and benchmark 
cash flows. We observe no relationship between hedge ratio volatility and past book profits from 
derivatives positions.  
We next perform one more robustness check to control for m anagerial compensation as 
discussed in Section 3.3. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the regressions of hedge ratio 
volatility on past cash flows while  controlling for the m anagerial compensation variables (delta 
                                                 
15 We also run the first stage estimation using only the first condition (non-zero hedge ratios) to define hedging 
activity and obtain similar results. They are not reported due to space constraints but are available on request. 
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and vega) of the CEO and the CFO. The regressi ons are univariate due to  the limited number of 
managerial compensation observations in our sam ple. However, the regre ssions indicate that 
overall, our inference regarding the effect of  derivatives cash flows on speculation rem ains 
unaffected while the managerial compensation variables are statistically insignificant. 
[Place Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
 
4.2 Accounting for asymmetry effects 
Having established the relation betw een speculation and derivatives cash flows, we now turn to 
our test for the presence of m anagerial overconfidence in our sam ple firms. We do so by 
examining the asymmetry in the relationship between derivatives cash flows and speculation. For 
this purpose, we run the following regression with dummy variables: 
 ttttt CONTROLSISCFbISCFbaV   212111                                 (4) 
In this regression, I1 (I2) is a dummy variable that equals on e if the selective hedging cash flow 
during the last quarter was positive (negativ e) and zero otherwise. We choose selective hedging 
cash flow to be the dependent variable because sele ctive hedging cash fl ow is the direct 
consequence of speculative decisions m ade by th e manager in the past, and therefore is m ore 
directly related to the extent to which past speculation was successful than total cash flows. We 
include the benchmark cash flow, along with the fi rm characteristics, in the matrix of control 
variables.16 
We estimate this regression first on a reduced sample of firm-quarters for active hedgers 
and next, using the Heckm an two-step procedure for robustness. The results of the second-stage 
                                                 
16 Nevertheless, we chec k robustness of the results to using total derivatives cash flow and find that the general 
result is similar in spirit although less significant. The results are not reported but are available upon request. 
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Heckman procedure with controls are presented in Table 9. 17 While the asymmetric response of 
hedge ratio volatility to selec tive cash flow persists in this  alternative sp ecification, the 
significance of the benchmark cash flow variable is diminished. 
[Place Table 9 about here] 
 From both Table 8 and Table 9, we observe that the relationship between hedge ratio 
volatility and past selective hedgin g cash flows is strongly positive only if the past sele ctive 
hedging cash flows are positiv e. A one-stand ard deviation increase in selec tive hedging cash 
flow leads to a 0.2774 increase in the quarterly vol atility of the one-year hedge ratio, which is 
22.5% of the sample mean of 1.2325. When selective hedging cash flows are negative, however , 
we observe no significant relationship except in the case of one-year hedge ratio volatility. 
However, while we would still expe ct a positive coefficient for one-year hedge ratio  volatility 
with negative sele ctive hedging ca sh flows if the re lation between s peculation and selective 
hedging cash flow is symmetric (since speculation should decr ease as speculation losses 
increase) this is the opposite of what we obs erve for one-year hedge ratio volatility. Thus, our 
evidence here strongly supports  an asymm etric relation be tween speculative activity and 
selective hedging cash flows, which confirm s the managerial overconfidence hypothesis for our 
sample firms. Managers increase speculative activity following successes (as th eir 
overconfidence rises) but do not sy mmetrically reduce it following fa ilures. This result is robust 
to the inclusion of firm characteristics that may affect the fundamental hedging needs of the firm, 
as well as to controlling for possible selection biases. 
 
                                                 
17 The results of the panel regressions on the reduced sample are qualitatively similar to the Heckman regressions 
and are available on request. 
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4.3 Other robustness checks 
In addition to controlling for the rational explanations as laid out in Section 3.3, we also perfor m 
a few more robustness checks. First, past cash flows as well as derivatives book profits m ay be 
related to movements in the price of gold over the same quarter. This concern is mitigated by the 
fact that derivatives cash flows are the result of hedging decisions  taken in the distant past as 
well as more current decisions and therefore, the recent change in the price of gold may not have 
a strong effect. Additio nally, this issue is  much less of  a concern for selectiv e hedging cash 
flows, which is our m ain variable of interest. Nevertheless, in unreported tests we include the 
change in the price of gold in our regressions without a substant ive effect on our results. In the 
two-stage Heckman framework, we also allow for the relationship between hedge ratio volatility 
and past selective hedging cash flows to be a f unction of the beginning-of-quarter hedge ratio. In 
these robustness tests, also available upon request, we continue to find that hedge ratio volatility 
is positively related to past derivatives cash fl ows and that the relationship is robustly stronger 
for positive selective hedging cash flows, cons istent with our m anagerial overconfidence 
hypothesis. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We add to the growing literature that documents the influence of managerial overconfidence in a 
variety of corporate finance settings, including investment and capital st ructure policy, mergers 
and acquisitions, security offerings and investment bank relationships, by showing that the effect 
of overconfidence also extends to corporat e hedging decisions. W e document a positive 
relationship between speculation an d past speculative gains, w ithout a corresponding relation 
between speculation and past speculative losses. This asymmetry supports the conjecture that the 
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financial success of past speculative decis ions increases managerial overconfidence, leading 
managers to elevate their levels of specu lation, while losses do not reduce m anagerial 
overconfidence because managers tend to attribute failures to bad luck. Our findings provide th e 
first evidence that co rporate risk m anagement practices are affected by behavioral managerial 
biases, and suggest that recognizing the presence of these biases will help bridge the gap between 
the theory and practice of corporate risk management. 
 21
Appendix 1: Variable Notations and Definitions 
Hedge Ratios: 
HR1 – HR5 are the hedge ratios from one- to five-year maturities, respectively; 
A3 is the aggregate hedge ratio that aggregate s the hedge p ositions over one-, two-, and three-
year horizons, scaled by the expected production;  
A3R is  the aggregate hedge ratio that aggregates the hedge positions over one-, two-, and three-
year horizons, scaled by gold reserves;  
A5R is  the aggregate hedge ratio  that aggregates the hedge positions over one-,  two-, three- , 
four- and five-year horizons, scaled by gold reserves. 
Hedge Ratio Volatility: 
V1 – V5  are the quarterly volatilities of the one-  through f ive-year hedge ratios, respectively. 
Quarterly volatility is the absolute value of the difference in the natural logarithms of the end-of- 
quarter and beginning-of-quarter hedge ratio levels. 
V6 – V8 are the corresponding quarterly volatilities for A3, A3R, and A5R, respectively. 
Derivatives Cash Flows: 
CF are the total cash flows from  derivatives positions (in $ per ounce hedged) estimated as in 
Adam and Fernando (2006);  
SCF and BCF are the selectiv e and the benchm ark cash flows, estimated as in Adam  and 
Fernando (2006);  
RBK is the change in the book value of the derivatives positions per ounce hedged (see 
Appendix 2). 
Firm Characteristics: 
SIZ is the logarithm of the market value of assets ($ million);  
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MB is the market-to-book ratio of assets; 
DE is the ratio of book debt to book equity;  
QCK is the quick ratio;  
DIV is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid quarterly dividend; 
RAT is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports a credit rating;  
Z is the Altman’s (1968) Z-score (higher value of Z corresponds to lower probability of 
bankruptcy).  
DELTA_CEO (CFO) is the ch ange in the dollar value of  the CEO’s (CFO’s) wealth der ived 
from ownership of stock and stoc k options in the firm  when the firm’s stock price changes by 
one percent, calculated according to the methodology of Core and Guay (2002). We calculate the 
aggregate delta of the executiv e’s compensation as the sum of the deltas of the options holdings 
and the delta of the stock holdings. 
VEGA_CEO (CFO) is the change in the dollar value of the CEO’s (CFO’s) wealth derived 
from ownership of stock and stock options in the firm when the annualized standard deviation of 
the firm’s stock price changes by 0.01, following Core and Guay (2002). We calculate the 
aggregate vega of the executive’s compensation as the sum of the vegas of the executive’s 
options holdings, following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). 
GLD is the change in the price of gold over the quarter; 
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Appendix 2: Calculation of Quarterly Derivatives Book Profits 
 
For the calculations of derivativ es book profits, we use delta of th e linear positions (which is 
equal to -1) and delta of option positions, which we  back out from the total delta of the firm. We 
calculate the delta of option positions at the end of the quarter as the firm’s total delta plus the 
number of linear contracts: 
 LoantSpottForwardtTotaltOptiont
NNN ,,,,,                              (A1) 
In (A1), Δt,Total is  the total delta of the firm, Nt,Forward is the number of forward contracts, Nt,Spot is 
the number of spot contracts, and Nt,Loan is the number of loan contracts. Then, for each quarter, 
we calculate the minimum of the two hedge positions,  
 ),1,,
,min( LineartLinearttNLIN NNMIN   (A2) 
 ),1,,
,min( OptiontOptionttNOPT NNMIN   (A3) 
Above, MINNLIN,t is the smaller of the beginning-of-quarter and end-of-quarter linear positions 
(forward plus spot plus loan) and MINNOPT,t is the smaller of the beginning-of-quarter and end-of-
quarter option positions. Obviously, at this step we lose observations where the size of the 
position is missing either at the beginning or at the end of the quarter. 
Next, we calculate th e delta MΔt,Option of option positions as the beginning-of-quarter  
delta Δt-1,Option, divided by the beginning-of -quarter option position Nt-1,Option, multiplied by the 
smaller of the beginning-of-quarter and the end-of-quarter positions: 
 OptionttNOPTOptiontOptiont
NMINM ,1,,1, /    (A4) 
If both option positions N,t,Option and Nt-1,Option are zero, then delta is set to zero. Next, we use the 
option delta MΔt,Option to calcu late the to tal book profits from linear position s BKt,Linear, from 
option positions BKt,Option, and from all positions BKt, where GOLDt is the price of one ounce of  
gold at the end of quarter t: 
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)( 1,, tttNLINLineart GOLDGOLDMINBK     (A5) 
 
)1()( 1,,   ttOptiontOptiont GOLDGOLDMBK   (A6) 
 OptiontLineartt
BKBKBK ,,    (A7) 
Finally, to adjust for the scale effect, we scal e the total profits by the average siz e of the 
firm’s position to obtain relative b ook profits from  option positions RBKt,Option, from linear 
positions RBKt,Linear, and from all positions RBKt,. The average size of the linear position LinearN  
is equal to the average num ber of linear con tracts reported by the firm over all quarters of the 
sample period in which a non-zero linear position is reported. The average size of the option 
positions OptionN  is computed similarly. 
 OptionOptiontOptiont
NBKRBK /,,    (A8) 
 LinearLineartLineart
NBKRBK /,,    (A9) 
 OptiontLineartt
RBKRBKRBK ,,    (A10) 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Hedge Ratios, Hedge Volatility, Cash Flows, and Firm Characteristics 
Descriptive statistics are estimated on the pooled dataset. The sample consists of quarterly observations from 1989-
1999 for a sample of 92 North American gold mining firms as reported in Gold and Silver Hedge Outlook. The table 
reports summary statistics for the following variables: hedge ratios of various maturities as well as aggregate hedge 
ratios estimated as the sum of the firm’s derivatives positions in place in quarter t (in ounces of gold), weighted by 
their respective deltas, scaled either by expected production or by reserves; hedge ratio volatilities estimated as the 
absolute value of the ratio of natural logarithms of the end-of-quarter to the beginning-of-quarter hedge ratio; total 
cash flows from derivatives positions per ounce hedged as well as selective and benchmark cash flows, which are 
estimated as in  Adam and Fernando (2006); derivatives book profit equal to the change in the book value of the 
derivatives positions per ounce hedged (see Appendix 2 for calculation); change in the price of gold per ounce; firm 
size measured as the logarithm of the m arket value of assets; market-to-book ratio of assets; ratio  of book debt to 
book equity; quick ratio; dividend dummy variable equal to one i f the firm paid quarterly dividend; credit rating 
dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports a credit rating; and Altman’s (1968) Z-score. Firm characteristics are 
from Compustat. 
 
Variable
One-year hedge ratio 0.2874 0.3179 0.0000 1.0000 1875
Two-year hedge ratio 0.1552 0.2418 0.0000 1.0000 1879
Three-year hedge ratio 0.0779 0.1722 0.0000 1.0000 1901
Four-year hedge ratio 0.0363 0.1135 0.0000 1.0000 1935
Five-year hedge ratio 0.0271 0.1092 0.0000 0.9990 1952
Aggregate 3-yr. ratio, prod. 0.1716 0.2402 0.0000 1.0000 1460
Aggregate 3-yr. ratio, res. 0.0465 0.0738 0.0000 0.6620 1460
Aggregate 5-yr. ratio, res. 0.0575 0.0961 0.0000 0.9857 1460
Volatiliy, 1-yr. ratio 1.2325 2.9044 0.0000 12.4055 1665
Volatility, 2-yr. ratio 1.2304 2.9902 0.0000 12.7594 1660
Volatility, 3-yr. ratio 0.8524 2.5275 0.0000 11.5129 1694
Volatility, 4-yr. ratio 0.8324 2.5702 0.0000 11.5129 1732
Volatility, 5-yr. ratio 0.5135 2.0428 0.0000 11.4742 1761
Volatility, 3-yr. agg. ratio, prod. 0.6838 2.0897 0.0000 11.5000 1253
Volatility, 3-yr. agg. ratio, res. 0.6477 1.8500 0.0000 10.5740 1262
Volatility, 5-yr. agg. ratio, res. 0.6867 1.8970 0.0000 11.2149 1304
Total derivative cash flow 4.8063 16.2041 -95.9039 180.1249 1788
Selective cash flow 0.3680 10.5898 -66.7713 201.8647 1801
Benchmark cash flow 4.4377 16.7540 -90.4059 180.1249 1788
Derivative book profit 2.1401 16.4882 -181.3730 106.0881 1750
Change in the price of gold -3.0569 17.7753 -48.9000 52.0000 1781
Size 5.5771 1.7608 1.0460 9.3604 1858
Market-to-Book ratio 1.9381 1.1137 0.2985 9.0819 1647
Debt-to-Equity ratio 0.4619 1.0772 0.0000 21.2707 1205
Quick ratio 4.2476 9.7254 0.0065 141.5172 1161
Dividend dummy 0.4701 0.4993 0.0000 1.0000 1289
Rating dummy 0.2454 0.4305 0.0000 1.0000 1312
Altman's Z-score 4.9900 13.5111 -22.8560 126.8310 1618
Number of
Deviation Observations
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
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Table 2 
Correlations Across Hedge Ratios and Across Hedge Ratio Volatilities 
Correlations are estimated on the pooled dataset. The sample consists of quarterly observations over 1989-1999 for a 
sample of 92 North American gold mining firms as reported in Gold and Silver Hedge Outlook. HR1 – HR5 are 
hedge ratios with one- to five- year maturity, respectively; V1 – V5 are t heir respective volatilities; A3 is t he 
aggregate 3-year hedge ratio scaled by expected production, A3R is the aggregate 3-year hedge rat io scaled by  
reserves, and A5R is the a ggregate five-year hedge ratio scaled by reserves, and V6 – V8 are their respective 
volatilities. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Correlations of the hedge ratios
HR1 HR2 HR3 HR4 HR5 A3 A3R A5R
HR1 1.0000
HR2 0.5841 *** 1.0000
HR3 0.4208 *** 0.7195 *** 1.0000
HR4 0.2591 *** 0.4611 *** 0.6717 *** 1.0000
HR5 0.1646 *** 0.2625 *** 0.4029 *** 0.5356 *** 1.0000
A3 0.7462 *** 0.9340 *** 0.8608 *** 0.5576 *** 0.3345 *** 1.0000
A3R 0.6457 *** 0.6901 *** 0.5993 *** 0.4317 *** 0.2919 *** 0.7750 *** 1.0000
A5R 0.5721 *** 0.6381 *** 0.6387 *** 0.5767 *** 0.4904 *** 0.7366 *** 0.9194 *** 1.0000
Panel B: Correlations of hedge ratio volatilities
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8
V1 1.0000
V2 0.2773 *** 1.0000
V3 0.1105 *** 0.2754 *** 1.0000
V4 0.0426 * 0.0556 ** 0.1512 *** 1.0000
V5 0.0380 0.0542 ** 0.1226 *** 0.3893 *** 1.0000
V6 0.8096 *** 0.5182 *** 0.3571 *** 0.0623 ** 0.0900 *** 1.0000
V7 0.7703 *** 0.3981 *** 0.2248 *** 0.1044 ** 0.1142 *** 0.9894 *** 1.0000
V8 0.7644 *** 0.3618 *** 0.2129 *** 0.0927 *** 0.1020 *** 0.9785 *** 0.9827 *** 1.0000
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Table 3 
Relationship between Speculation and Past Total Derivatives Cash Flows 
The table presents the results of the panel regressions with firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the volatility 
of the hedge ratio. Hedge ratio volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the logs of the hedge 
ratio in the end and the beginning of the quarter. The independent variables are as follows: CF is the total derivatives 
cash flow in the previous quarter; RBK is th e change in th e book value of derivatives positions in th e previous 
quarter. Seasonal dummies are included in each of the models. The regressions include the fol lowing firm 
characteristics as control va riables: SIZ, firm size measured as t he logarithm of the market value of assets; MB, 
market-to-book ratio of assets; DE, ratio of book debt to book equity; QCK, quick ratio; DIV, dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm paid quarterly dividend; RAT, dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports a credit rating; and Z, 
Altman’s Z-score. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics 
corrected for cluster effects are reported in parentheses.  
 
Intercept 0.9315 *** 2.9375 0.7202 *** 3.7069 * 0.6400 *** 1.6145 0.7448 *** 1.2300
(5.29) (1.10) (5.46) (1.93) (4.75) (0.80) (6.40) (0.77)
CF 0.023 *** 0.0181 ** 0.0213 *** 0.0113 0.0237 *** 0.0209 *** 0.0164 *** 0.0150 **
(3.60) (2.24) (3.03) (1.53) (3.54) (2.95) (3.53) (2.89)
RBK 0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0038 -0.0003 -0.0021
(0.91) (-0.72) (-0.69) (-0.74) (-1.29) (-1.68) (-0.23) (-0.97)
SIZ -0.1817 -0.3584 -0.0319 0.0572
(-0.39) (-1.18) (-0.09) (0.20)
Z 0.0730 * 0.0787 0.0458 0.0490 *
(1.36) (1.64) (1.29) (1.91)
QCK 0.0212 -0.0208 -0.0342 -0.0127
(0.27) (-0.57) (-1.24) (-0.44)
MB -0.5594 *** -0.2617 * -0.2153 -0.2190 **
(-2.64) (-1.76) (-1.53) (-1.98)
DE -0.1862 -0.2467 -0.4726 *** -0.3233 **
(-1.12) (-1.28) (-4.46) (-2.32)
DIV 0.2905 -0.2261 -0.2401 -0.6023 ***
(0.68) (-0.70) (-1.07) (-3.52)
RAT -0.3583 -0.0684 -0.1324 -0.2063
(-0.68) (-0.19) (-0.43) (-0.77)
Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.0304 0.0382 0.0263 0.0330 0.0379 0.0519 0.0204 0.0364
F-statistic 4.70 1.62 3.85 1.64 3.44 5.82 3.27 2.84
Observations 1112 638 788 465 854 529 1005 621
Clusters 84 65 65 48 61 51 63 53
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
one-year hedge ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
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Table 4 
Relationship between Speculation and Past Selective Hedging Cash Flows 
The table presents the results of the panel regressions with firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the volatility 
of the hedge ratio. Hedge ratio volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the logs of the hedge 
ratio in the end and the beginning of the quarter. The independent variables are as follows: SCF is the selective 
hedging cash flow in the previous quarter; BCF is th e benchmark cash flow in th e previous quarter; RBK is t he 
change in the book value of derivatives positions in the previous quarter. Seasonal dummies are included in each of 
the models. The regressions include the following firm characteristics as control variables: SIZ, firm size measured 
as the logarithm of the market value of assets; MB, market-to-book ratio of assets; DE, ratio of book debt to book 
equity; QCK, quick ratio; DIV, dummy variable equal to one i f the firm paid quarterly dividend; RAT, dummy 
variable equal to one if a firm reports a credit rating; and Z, Altman’s Z-score. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics corrected for cluster effects are reported in parentheses.  
 
Intercept 0.9468 *** 2.9597 0.7154 *** 3.9226 ** 0.6301 *** 1.7182 0.7338 *** 1.3219
(5.50) (1.11) (5.39) (2.02) (4.65) (0.84) (6.31) (0.82)
SCF 0.0174 * 0.0199 0.0237 *** 0.0210 ** 0.0273 *** 0.0263 *** 0.0202 *** 0.0212 ***
(1.66) (1.54) (2.97) (2.80) (3.43) (3.45) (3.14) (3.02)
BCF 0.0249 *** 0.0173 ** 0.0209 *** 0.0092 0.0224 *** 0.0180 ** 0.0153 *** 0.0124 **
(3.56) (2.15) (2.95) (1.26) (3.39) (2.50) (3.40) (2.49)
RBK 0.0021 -0.0117 -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0040 * -0.0004 -0.0023
(0.96) (-0.73) (-0.72) (-0.86) (-1.36) (-1.77) (-0.30) (-1.08)
SIZ -0.1851 -0.3901 -0.0454 0.0413
(-0.40) (-1.28) (-0.13) (0.14)
Z 0.0736 0.0825 0.0493 0.0514 **
(1.37) (1.70) (1.36) (1.96)
QCK 0.0205 -0.0239 -0.0382 -0.0156
(0.26) (-0.65) (-1.39) (-0.54)
MB -0.5615 *** -0.2738 * -0.2282 * -0.2202 **
(-2.64) (-1.87) (-1.64) (-2.00)
DE -0.1871 -0.2505 -0.4789 *** -0.3268 **
(-1.12) (-1.31) (-4.65) (-2.36)
DIV 0.2899 -0.2042 -0.2401 -0.5993 ***
(0.68) (-0.67) (-1.10) (-3.58)
RAT -0.3553 -0.0431 -0.1203 -0.1940
(-0.67) (-0.12) (-0.40) (-0.73)
Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.0308 0.0384 0.0267 0.0349 0.0399 0.0567 0.0229 0.0434
F-statistic 3.88 1.50 3.62 1.98 3.15 6.15 3.02 2.90
Observations 1112 638 788 465 854 529 1005 621
Clusters 84 65 65 48 61 51 63 53
(5) (6) (7) (8)(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
one-year hedge ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
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Table 5 
Determinants of Hedging Activity: First Stage of the Two-Step Heckman Regression With Selection 
The table reports the results of the PROBIT model. The dependent variable is the hedging activity dummy equal to 
zero if (1) either the firm had zero hedge ratios in both the beginning and the end of quarter t; or (2) the firm had 
zero cash flows from hedging operations in quarter t-1. The independent variables are:  firm size measured as the  
logarithm of the market value of assets; market-to-book ratio of assets; r atio of book debt to book equity; quick 
ratio; dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid quarterly dividend; dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports 
a credit rating; and Altman’s Z-score. Z-statistics are in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Intercept 0.5409 **
(2.10)
Size 0.2403 ***
(4.50)
Market-to-book -0.3013 ***
(-3.91)
Debt-to-Equity -0.2064 ***
(-2.82)
Quick ratio -0.0789 ***
(-4.98)
Dividend dummy -0.487 ***
(-3.25)
Credit rating dummy 0.0916
(0.61)
Altman Z-score -0.0193
(-1.25)
Pseudo-R2 0.1051
Chi2 86.57
Observations 792
Probability of Hedging
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Table 6 
Determinants of Hedge Ratio Volatility Conditional on Hedging Activity:  
Second Stage of the Two-Step Heckman Regression with Selection 
The table reports the results of the second stage of the two-step Heckman procedure. In the first stage (see Table 6), 
we estimate the likelihood of hedging activity in a given quarter. In the second stage, we estimate the relationship 
between hedge ratio volatility in quarter t versus cash flows and book profits from derivatives positions in quarter t-
1, conditional on hedging activity. Hedge ratio volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the 
logs of the hedge ratio from the beginning to the end of the quarter. CF is the total derivatives cash flow; SCF is 
selective hedging cash flow; BCF is the benchmark cash flow; RBK is the change in the book value of derivatives 
positions. Seasonal dummies are in cluded in each model. The regressions control for the following firm 
characteristics: firm size measured as the logarithm of the market value of assets; market-to-book ratio of assets; 
ratio of book debt to book equity; quick ratio; dividend dummy variable equal to on e if th e firm paid quarterly 
dividend; credit rating dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports a credi t rating; and Al tman’s Z-score. The 
regressions include the Inverse Mills ratio estimated on the first stage of the Heckman procedure. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics corrected for cluster effects are reported 
in parentheses.  
 
Intercept 4.4363 *** 4.4151 *** 2.3099 2.2593 3.1157 ** 3.0198 ** 2.5783 ** 2.437 **
(2.99) (2.94) (1.13) (1.11) (2.41) (2.32) (2.37) (2.22)
CF 0.00221 ** 0.0234 ** 0.0215 *** 0.0161 ***
(2.53) (2.35) (3.39) (3.07)
SCF 0.0238 * 0.0288 ** 0.0263 *** 0.0224 ***
(1.96) (2.67) (4.10) (3.68)
BCF 0.0212 ** 0.0223 ** 0.0184 *** 0.0129 **
(2.29) (2.27) (2.73) (2.49)
RBK -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0017
(-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.84) (-0.90) (-1.18) (-1.24) (-0.75) (-0.83)
Inverse Mills -3.7381 -3.7044 -1.2069 -1.0787 -3.1570 -2.9739 -1.5532 -1.3087
Ratio (-1.38) (-1.36) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-1.25) (-1.17) (-0.82) (-0.69)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.0769 0.0770 0.0738 0.0749 0.0879 0.0916 0.0738 0.0786
F-statistic 5.32 4.96 2.97 2.73 3.10 3.33 2.44 2.99
Observations 585 585 442 442 526 526 614 614
Clusters 53 53 42 42 51 51 53 53
(5) (6) (7) (8)(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
one-year hedge ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
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Table 7 
Determinants of Hedge Ratio Volatility Conditional on Hedging Activity:  
Controlling for Managerial Compensation (CEO) 
The table reports the results of the second stage of the two-step Heckman procedure. In the first stage (see Table 6), 
we estimate the likelihood of hedging activity in a given quarter. In the second stage, we estimate the relationship 
between hedge ratio volatility in quarter t versus cash flows and book profits from derivatives positions in quarter t-
1, conditional on hedging activity. Hedge ratio volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the 
logs of the hedge ratio from the beginning to the end of the quarter. CF is the total derivatives cash flow; SCF is 
selective hedging cash flow; BCF is the benchmark cash flow; DELTA_CEO and VEGA_CEO are the managerial 
compensation sensitivities for the CEO. The reg ressions include the Inverse Mills ratio  estimated on the first stage 
of the Heckman procedure. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% le vels, respectively. Robust t-
statistics corrected for cluster effects are reported in parentheses.  
 
Intercept 0.2460 0.2453 1.4696 1.4616 1.0222 1.0261 1.7445 1.7351
(0.21) (0.21) (0.81) (0.81) (0.78) (0.78) (1.26) (1.24)
CF 0.0159 0.0183 0.0161  ** 0.0171  **
(1.35) (1.19) (2.08) (2.82)
SCF 0.0143 0.0169 0.0182  ** 0.0212  **
(0.79) (0.81) (2.03) (2.74)
BCF 0.0164 0.0186 0.0155  ** 0.0159  **
(1.47) (1.25) (2.05) (2.72)
DELTA_CEO -0.1665 -0.1638 -0.1755 -0.1725 -0.1250 -0.1291 -0.1260 -0.1346
(-0.96) (-0.95) (-0.88) (-0.91) (-1.12) (-1.20) (-1.18) (-1.31)
VEGA_CEO 0.2002 0.1963 0.0822 0.0788 0.0738 0.0791 0.0176 0.0291
(1.18) (1.18) (0.35) (0.35) (0.53) (0.58) (0.12) (0.19)
Inverse Mills 0.1638 3.1772 1.9141 1.9362 1.0782 1.0549 0.2416 0.2517
Ratio (1.76) (1.75) (1.09) (1.11) (0.87) (0.86) (0.32) (0.34)
R2 0.0545 0.0544 0.037 0.0371 0.0407 0.0409 0.0466 0.0478
F-statistic 2.08 1.64 1.46 1.16 2.19 1.91 3.41 3.30
Observations 146 146 106 106 127 127 155 155
Clusters 41 41 31 31 39 39 42 42
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
one-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
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Table 8 
Determinants of Hedge Ratio Volatility Conditional on Hedging Activity:  
Controlling for Managerial Compensation (CFO) 
The table reports the results of the second stage of the two-step Heckman procedure. In the first stage (see Table 6), 
we estimate the likelihood of hedging activity in a given quarter. In the second stage, we estimate the relationship 
between hedge ratio volatility in quarter t versus cash flows and book profits from derivatives positions in quarter t-
1, conditional on hedging activity. Hedge ratio volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the 
logs of the hedge ratio from the beginning to the end of the quarter. CF is the total derivatives cash flow; SCF is 
selective hedging cash flow; BCF is the benchmark cash flow; DELTA_CFO and VEGA_CFO are the managerial 
compensation sensitivities for the CEO. The reg ressions include the Inverse Mills ratio  estimated on the first stage 
of the Heckman procedure. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% le vels, respectively. Robust t-
statistics corrected for cluster effects are reported in parentheses.  
 
Intercept -1.4314 -1.4416 -4.1473 -4.1741 -3.1787 -3.1686  * -1.6036 -1.6082
(-0.66) (-0.65) (-1.51) (-1.46) (-1.78) (-1.71) (-1.22) (-1.21)
CF 0.0565  ** 0.0499  ** 0.039  *** 0.0409  **
(2.48) (2.59) (2.86) (2.65)
SCF 0.0749 0.0834  * 0.06  ** 0.055  **
(1.50) (1.88) (2.09) (2.16)
BCF 0.0543  ** 0.0465  ** 0.0366  *** 0.0388  **
(2.52) (2.46) (2.75) (2.55)
DELTA_CFO 0.2539 0.2132 0.5191 0.4235 0.3593 0.3118 0.2366 0.2194
(0.82) (0.74) (1.20) (1.02) (1.35) (1.22) (1.21) (1.16)
VEGA_CFO -0.1079 -0.0499 -0.1494 -0.0148 -0.0575 0.0109 -0.0678 -0.0478
(-0.40) (-0.19) (-0.48) (-0.05) (-0.33) (0.07) (-0.47) (-0.34)
Inverse Mills 3.3311 3.2148 2.9886 2.6094 2.0427 1.785 0.7582 0.9108
Ratio (1.08) (1.05) (1.22) (1.12) (1.18) (1.07) (1.15) (1.16)
R2 0.1164 0.1209 0.176 0.1986 0.2023 0.2212 0.1606 0.1736
F-statistic 2.06 1.84 1.88 1.93 2.22 2.13 1.91 1.65
Observations 68 68 52 52 60 60 72 72
Clusters 22 22 17 17 20 20 23 23
(5) (6) (7) (8)(1) (2) (3) (4)
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
one-year hedge ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
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Table 9 
Testing for Asymmetric Volatility Response with Selection 
The table reports the results of the second stage of the two-step Heckman procedure. In the first stage, we estimate 
the likelihood of hedging activity in a given quarter. In the second stage, we estimate the following regression of the 
three-year aggregate hedge ratio volatility on past selective hedging cash flows from derivatives positions, while 
allowing for an asymmetric response. The volatility is estimated as the absolute value of the difference in the logs of 
the hedge ratio in the end and the beginning of the quarter. SCF is the selective hedging cash flow in the previous 
quarter. BCF is the benchmark cash flow. I1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the selective hedging cash flow 
during the last quarter was positive, and equals zero otherwise; and I2 is a du mmy variable that equals one if the  
selective hedging cash flow was negative, and equals zero otherwise. The Inverse Mills ratio is obtained on the first 
stage of the Heckman procedure. The second-stage regressions includes: firm size measured as the logarithm of the 
market value of assets; market-to-book ratio of assets; ratio of book debt to book equity; quick ratio; dividend 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid quarterly dividend; credit rating dummy variable equal to one if a firm 
reports a credit rating; and Altman’s Z-score. Seasonal dummies are included in each model and ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust t-statistics corrected for cluster effects are reported 
in parentheses.  
 
 
Intercept 4.6787 *** 3.5631 ** 3.3262 *** 2.3019 **
(3.04) (2.07) (2.91) (2.01)
SCF1 0.0369 *** 0.0280 * 0.0292 *** 0.0278 ***
(3.85) (1.84) (5.09) (4.87)
SCF2 -0.0207 0.0147 0.0039 0.0025
(-1.19) (1.38) (0.43) (0.31)
BCF 0.0076 0.0097 0.0079 0.0057 *
(1.00) (1.57) (1.56) (1.82)
Inverse Mills -4.4532 ** -3.57 -3.5717 ** -1.6059
Ratio (-2.15) (-1.45) (-2.19) (-1.08)
Dummies YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
R2 0.077 0.0505 0.0879 0.0781
F-statistic 4.6 3.43 5.48 4.24
Observations 588 445 528 610
Clusters 53 41 51 53
scaled by production scaled by reserves scaled by reserves
one-year hedge ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 3-year ratio aggregate 5-year ratio
Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of Volatility of
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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